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Statutory Protection Against Condominium Conversions for

North Carolina Residential Tenants
On January 1, 1984 North Carolina joined the majority ofjurisdictions by
granting residential tenants statutory protection against conversion of their
leased units into condominiums. I This protection, enacted as an amendment
to the North Carolina Unit Ownership Act, 2 requires a landlord or developer
to provide advance notice of the conversion to all residential tenants, and

grants these tenants the first option to purchase their particular unit. 3 The
statute was enacted in response to a growing condominium conversion trend
that has been characterized as the "most controversial real estate phenomenon
to strike America in over 100 years. ' 4 This note examines the impact of the
conversion trend on residential tenants and analyzes the effectiveness of North
Carolina's response.
States began recognizing condominium ownership during the early
1960s, 5 and over ninety percent of the existing two million condominiums
were created after 1970.6 Condominiums never have been a source of much
7
legal or political controversy, and they are now recognized in every state.
Although condominiums frequently are created through new construction,
conversion of rental housing into condominiums recently has become popular.8 During the first half of this decade, an estimated 1,139,000 rental units
will be converted into condominiums-three times the number converted dur1. A condominium consists of "two principal elements: (1) separate ownership of a part of
a building (apartment), coupled with (2) common ownership with other apartment owners in the
land and such part of the buildings as are intended for common use." A. FERRER & K. STECHER,
LAW OF CONDOMINIUM 2 (1967). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-3(5) (1976) ("'Condominium'
means the ownership of single units in a multi-unit structure with common areas and facilities.").
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47A-1 to -37 (1976 & Supp. 1983). The Act recognizes condominium
ownership and establishes procedures for the registration, public sale, and management of a condominium project.
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-36 (Supp. 1983). See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
4. Condominium and Cooperative Conversions-The FederalResponse: HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1 162 (1981) (statement of Kathleen R. Beal) [hereinafter
cited as 1981 House Hearings].
5. U.S. DEe'T OF Hous. & URBAN DE., THE CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING TO CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES, A NATIONAL STUDY OF SCOPE, CAUSES AND IMPACTS XI-I

(1980) [hereinafter cited as HUD REPORT].
The condominium originated in the ancient civilizations of the Middle East and the Mediterranean and has long been recognized under civil law. For a discussion of the historical development of condominium ownership through ancient, civil, and common law, see A. FERRER & K.
STECHER, supra note I, at 14-81; P. ROHAN & M. REsKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE 21 to 2-9 (1983).
6. Condominium HousingIssues: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking,Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979)
(statement of Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
7. Note, Condominium Conversion Lease Extensionsfor Elderly and Disabled Tenants: Is
Virginia'sNew Law a Panacea?, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 207, 209-10 (1982).
8. Condominium conversion involves a "change in the legal form of a multi-family rental
property from single to multiple ownership. The change is made by filing a legal declaration,
master deed, or subdivision application to the appropriate government body. After any necessary
approval is received units in the condominium ... may be sold." HUD REPORT, supra note 5, at
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ing the 1970s. 9
Several factors have caused this dramatic increase. First, landlords find

conversion economically desirable. The aggregate sale price of units in a converted building will secure a return ten times the building's annual rental in-

come, 10 and from one and one-half to two times the market price of the
building as rental property."I Such an immediate and sizeable return is ex-

tremely attractive, particularly considering the growing body of local landlord-tenant regulations' 2 and the increasing cost of maintenance and

administration. 13 Second, a strong market for condominiums has developed14
among a wide spectrum of buyers. The condominium offers the economic

and tax' 5 advantages of home ownership to low-to-middle income families
who cannot afford traditional single-family homes. Upper income families
view condominium ownership as an economically attractive means to enjoy an
urban lifestyle while avoiding the maintenance burdens of the traditional single-family home. 16 The condominium also has become an attractive investment device; one-third of all condominiums are held as investment property
17
for lease to tenants.

The original tenant of the converted unit is the third party (in addition to
the landlord and the unit purchaser) affected by a conversion. Approximately

twenty-two percent of tenants purchase their individual unit.' 8 An additional
twenty-two percent obtain continued lease agreements from the new unit ownapp. ii. For a description of the administrative and financial requirements of conversion, see id at

III-I to -23.
9. Id at VII-37. From 1970 through 1979, 346,476 rental units were converted. The vast
majority of these conversions, 260,730, occurred in the last four years of that decade. Id at IV-6.
10. Judson, Defning PropertyRights: The ConstitutionalityofProtecting Tenantsfrom Condominium Conversions, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 179, 187 (1983).
11. Berger, The New Residential Tenancy Law-Are Landlords Public Utilities?, 60 NEB. L.
REV. 707, 733-34 (1981).
12. Judson, supra note 10, at 187. Such regulations can include rent controls, eviction restrictions, and heating standards, as well as general building, fire, and health code requirements. The
more stringent landlord-tenant regulations are found in the large urban centers. As such, the
desire to escape regulation is not as significant a factor in North Carolina as in more populous
states.

13. From 1967 to 1980, general consumer prices increased 148% while rent increased only
92%. Berger, supra note 11, at 729 n.109. Rent has failed to keep pace with other prices because
of local rent controls, organized tenant resistance, and the inability of low and fixed income tenants to pay higher rents. HUD REPORT, supra note 5, at 1-13; Judson, supra note 10, at 187.
14. Because the owner of a condominium possesses an equity interest in his unit, he benefits
from any appreciation in the value of the unit. A tenant possesses no such interest. Berger, supra
note 11, at 734.
15. The condominium owner may deduct payments for mortgage interest, I.R.C. § 163(a)
(1976), and real property taxes, I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (1976), in calculating his federal income tax.
The tenant, however, receives no deduction for rent payments. Furthermore, the condominium
owner can qualify for capital gains treatment of any appreciation in value when the unit is sold.
I.R.C § 1202 (Supp. 1981).
16. Judson, supra note 10, at 186. Thirty-eight percent of condominium purchases are motivated principally by noneconomic reasons. HUD REPORT, supra note 5, at VI-8.
17. HUD REPORT, supra note 5, at VI-2. See also id at VI-1 1 to -14 (analysis of the condominium as investment).
18. Id at IX-10.
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ers and remain in their unit.1 9 The remaining fifty-six percent, however, are
20
displaced by the conversion because they cannot or choose not to remain.
This high displacement rate has caused the current controversy over conversions and has prompted the legislative responses discussed in this note. Displaced tenants must compete among themselves to locate affordable
replacement housing, often in a rental market characterized by a low vacancy
rate.2 1 Because conversion removes rental units from the market, each con-

version makes the search for housing more difficult. 22 In addition to this problem of finding replacement housing, conversion also imposes moving
expenses, as well as the burden of reestablishing a lifestyle in a new building
or community, on the tenant. 23 Although these problems exist in any type of
relocation, conversion is unique because it involves the involuntary simultaneous displacement of a large group of people.
Response to the conversion problem began at the municipal level in
North Carolina. In 1980 Chapel Hill, a university town heavily dependent on
rental housing, asserted the authority to regulate conversions through its zoning powers and barred a landlord from converting his apartment building into
condominiums. 24 The North Carolina Court of Appeals held this action invalid in Graham Court Associates v. Town of ChapelHill.25 The court ruled that

the town's zoning powers provided no right or legal authority to prohibit the
conversion. 2 6 The applicable zoning statute 27 authorizes a municipality to

regulate the use of land within its boundaries, but the court found that conversion merely changes the form of ownership. 28 Accordingly, the conversion
was not subject to local regulation.
Two years after this unsuccessful municipal effort, the North Carolina
legislature enacted the tenant protection statute. 29 The statute contains two

provisions designed to ease the tenant's burden during conversion. First, it
19. Id at IX-13.
20. Id
21. The national vacancy rate is 4.8%. Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 2 (statement of Sen.
Harrison A. Williams Jr.).
22. Comment, The Condominium ConversionProblem: Causes andSolutions, 1980 DuKE L.J.
306, 317. Because of the high cost ofconstruction and mortgage financing, few converted units are
replaced through new construction. Id at 317-18.
23. Judson, supra note 10, at 190-9 1. These relocation problems have a more severe effect on
elderly and disabled tenants. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
24. Graham Court Assocs. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 53 N.C. App. 543, 546, 281 S.E.2d 418,
419 (1981).
25. 53 N.C. App. 543, 281 S.E.2d 418 (1981).
26. Id at 551, 281 S.E.2d at 423.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-381 (1981). A similar statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340
(Supp. 1983), authorizes county governments to regulate the use of land within their boundaries,
Presumably, the Graham Court Assocs. ruling would apply to county as well as municipal
governments.
28. Graham CourtAssocs., 53 N.C. App. at 551, 281 S.E.2d at 422. Accord City of Miami
Beach v. Arlen King Cole Condominium Ass'n, 302 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); AMN,
Inc. v. South Brunswick Township Leveling Bd., 93 N.J. 518, 461 A.2d 1138 (1983); Maplewood
Village Tenants Ass'n v. Maplewood Village, 116 N.J. Super. 372, 282 A.2d 428 (1971). But see
Goldman v. Town of Dennis, 375 Mass. 197, 375 N.E.2d 1212 (1978) (conversion involving a
probable change in the building's use is subject to zoning regulation).
29. An Act to Protect Renters of Apartment Buildings Being Converted to Condominiums,

1984]

PROPtERTY

1349

requires the landlord to give the tenant ninety days notice of the conversion. 30

If the tenant's lease extends beyond this ninety-day period, presumably he will
be allowed to complete his full lease term.3 1 Second, the landlord must give
the tenant a thirty-day first option to purchase his unit. 32 The landlord must
include with the option an offering statement containing a description of the
condominium and any planned improvements, the terms of any warranties,
and any other information given to prospective nontenant buyers. 33 Once the

tenant elects to exercise
his option, he is granted an additional thirty days to
34
complete the sale.
The ninety-day notice requirement is similar to notice requirements en-

acted by twenty-five other states and the District of Columbia.3 5 The purpose
1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 624, § I (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47A-34 to -37 (Supp.
1983)).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-36(a) (Supp. 1983).
31. The statute is unclear on this point. A landlord could argue that the statute empowers
him to evict a tenant at the end of the 90-day notice period, regardless of the remaining duration
of the lease. One commentator, however, has noted that such a construction would be an unconstitutional taking of the tenant's leasehold without due process. See Note, Condominium Conversions-Balancing Tenants' Rights and Property Owners' Interests, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 349, 359
(1980).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-36(b) (Supp. 1983).
33. Id § 47A-35.
34. Id § 47A-36(b).
The constitutionality of North Carolina's tenant notice and first option provisions is not at
issue. Courts have consistently found these and more stringent tenant protection requirements
constitutional when subjected to due process (uncompensated taking) and equal protection challenges. See River Park Tenants Ass'n v. 3600 Venture, 534 F. Supp. 45, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (extended notice requirement for elderly and disabled tenants survives equal protection analysis
(dicta)); Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 692, 418 N.E.2d 335 (1981) (temporary
moratorium on all evictions during conversion upheld against due process challenge); Grace v.
Town of Brookline, 379 Mass. 43, 399 N.E.2d 1038 (1979) (6 month moratorium on all evictions
during conversion upheld against due process and equal protection challenges); Reiner-Kaiser
Assocs. v. McConnachie, 104 Misc. 2d 750, 429 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1979) (ban on eviction of elderly
tenants during conversion upheld against equal protection challenge); see also Judson, supra note
10, at 198-230; Rosenthal, The Legality and Practicalityof Condominium Conversion Moratoriums,
34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1199, 1211-1222 (1980); Note, Ffth Amendment Takings and Condominium
ConversionRegulations that Restrict Owner OccupancyRights, 62 B.U.L. REv. 467, 486-91 (1982);
Note, The Validity of OrdinancesLimiting Condominium Conversions, 78 MICH. L. REv. 124, 13435 (1979).
35. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1326(B) (Supp. 1983) (120 day notice); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 66427.1(c) (West 1954) (180 day notice); COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-33-112(3) (1973) (90 day
notice); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-88b(b)(3) (West Supp. 1983) (180 day notice); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 45-1868 (b)(1) (1981) (120 day notice); FLA. STAT. § 718.606(1) (Supp. 1981) (270 day
notice for tenants in possession over 180 days; 180 day notice for all other tenants); GA. CODE
ANN. § 44-3-87(a) (Supp. 1983) (120 day notice); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 330(a) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1983) (120 day notice); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1604-111(a) (Supp. 1983) (120 day
notice); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-102.1(c) (Supp. 1983) (180 day notice); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 26.50(204) (Callaghan Supp. 1983) (120 day notice); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515A.4-1 10(a)
(West Supp. 1983) (120 day notice); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 448.4-112(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (120 day
notice); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356-B:56(II) (Supp. 1981) (90 day notice); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:18-61.2(g) (West Supp. 1983) (3 year notice); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eee(2)(d)(ii) to eeee(2)(d)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1983) (local governments in New York City metropolitan area
empowered to require 3 year notice); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(G) (Page 1981) (120 day
notice); OR. REv. STAT. § 94.116(1) (1953) (120 days notice); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 3410(a)
(Purdon Supp. 1983) (1 year notice); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-4.12(a) (Supp. 1983) (120 day
notice); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-31-420(A) (Supp. 1983) (90 day notice); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-27123(a) (1982) (60 day notice); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.94(b) (Supp. 1983) (120 day notice); WASH.
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of such notice is to afford the displaced tenant ample time to secure suitable
replacement housing. Although the ninety-day period is shorter than the notice periods provided in most conversion statutes, 36 it gives most tenants sufficient time to find replacement housing since a displaced tenant usually can
find similar housing within thirty to ninety days. 37 For these tenants, the
ninety-day notice period will ease the burden of conversion.
Although the notice period is sufficient for the majority of tenants, it is
inadequate for elderly and disabled tenants, two groups with special housing
needs. Conversion particularly harms the elderly. During a conversion, elderly tenants will very likely be among those displaced. 38 Because of fixed incomes, many elderly tenants are unable to obtain the necessary financing to
purchase their individual unit. 39 Moreover, those who can afford to purchase
may have no desire to do so. Given their shorter remaining life expectancies,
the advantages of establishing equity in a condominium are less attractive to
elderly tenants; such tenants may prefer to keep their financial resources in
40
liquid assets for present use and enjoyment.
In addition to being highly susceptible to displacement, the elderly have
the most difficulty in obtaining replacement housing. Many elderly tenants
cannot search for new housing without physical assistance. Additional
problems arise from the need to find housing with adequate security, easy
physical access, and sufficient proximity to medical care. 4 1 Finally, the elderly
can suffer chronic emotional and psychological harm after being forced to
move. Displacement disrupts established patterns of daily life and causes increased stress and anxiety. The more serious of these disruptions include impaired access to family members, friends, church services, and preferred
42
medical care.
REv. CODE ANN. § 59.18-200(2) (Supp. 1983) (90 day notice); W. VA. CODE § 36B-4-1 10(a) (Supp.
1983) (120 day notice); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 703.08(1) (West 1957) (120 day notice).
Congress has conducted extensive hearings on the need for federal conversion rights for tenants. See, e.g., 1981 House Hearings,supra note 5; Condominium Conversions: Hearingsbeforethe
Subcomm. on Housingand Consumer Interests of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 House Hearings];Senate Hearings,supra note 6. In the
Condominium and Cooperative Conversion Protection and Abuse Relief Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C.
§ 3605 (1982), however, Congress merely urged state and local governments to enact their own
notice and first-purchase option requirements. This result reflected a belief that the issue of "no-

tice and opportunity to purchase" is "more appropriately addressed at the state and local level."
H.R. REP. No. 1420, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 167, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3617, 3712.
36. -Most states require a 120 or 180 day notice to the tenants. See supra note 35.
37. HUD REPORT, supra note 5, at IX-15.
38. Thirty-seven percent of displaced tenants are over fifty-five years old. 1980 House Hear-

ings, supra note 35, at 7 (statement of Michael A. Stegman, Deputy Ass't See'y for Research, U.S.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.).
39. Note, supra note 7, at 210.
40. Note, Conversionof 4partmentsto Condominiumsand Cooperatives: ProtectingTenants in
New York, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 705, 708 (1975).
41. Comment, Converson ofApartments to Condominiums: Social and Economic Regulations
Under the CaliforniaSubdivision Map Act, 16 CAL. W.L. REv. 466, 468 (1980).

42. These disruptions and the emotional and psychological harm associated with them are
discussed in several studies. See 1981 House Hearings,supra note 4, pt. I at 162 (report of Kathleen R. Beal, Gerontology Program, George Washington Univ.); 1980 House Hearings,supra note
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Like the elderly, the disabled require more time to adjust to the change

and locate a new home. For example, they have specialized housing needs
that require easy physical access and close proximity to medical care. Locat-

ing replacement housing that meets these special needs may be difficult.
this search since many disabled tenants
Rental costs can further complicate
43
depend on fixed incomes.
Ten states and the District of Columbia have recognized these special

problems and have enacted either eviction prohibitions or additional notice

requirements for elderly and disabled tenants. 44 The North Carolina notice

requirement lacks such a provision. Thus, although the current notice requirement is a significant step in the right direction, the legislature should consider

notice requirement of one to three years for elderly and disabled
an extended
45

tenants.
The second provision of the North Carolina statute requires a landlord or
46

developer to grant the tenant a thirty-day first option to buy his apartment.

This first-purchase option is designed to prevent developers from securing ad-

vance purchase commitments from third parties before notifying tenants of the
planned conversion. First option requirements have gained wide legislative

acceptance; twenty-one jurisdictions besides North Carolina now require them
in all conversions. 47
35, at 65 (report of Dr. Leon A. Pastalan, Dir., Environment and Aging Program, Univ. of Michigan Inst. of Gerontology); Senate Hearings,supra note 6, at 116 (report of Legal Research & Serv.
or the Elderly, Nat'l Council of Senior Citizens).
43. Note, supra note 7, at 210. If the tenant's disability is total, he may be completely dependent on social security, veteran's benefits, worker's compensation, or private insurance benefits for
subsistence.
44. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47(a)-23c(b) (West Supp. 1983) (general prohibition of
eviction of blind, disabled, or elderly tenants); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1616(a) (1981) (prohibits
eviction of elderly tenants with annual incomes below $30,000 during a conversion); MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-137 (Supp. 1983) (3 year notice of conversion to elderly tenants on fixed
incomes); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.50(204b) (Callaghan Supp. 1983) (4 to 10 year notice determined by tenant's age; 4 year notice to disabled tenants); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515A.4-1 10(a)
(West Supp. 1983) (180 day notice to elderly tenants); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.22 to .39 (West
Supp. 1983) (local government authorized to grant disabled and elderly tenants individual lease
extensions for a maximum of 40 years); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(2-a)(b)(ii) (McKinney Supp.
1983) (prohibits eviction of disabled and elderly tenants during a conversion); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
68, § 3410(0 (Purdon Supp. 19.83) (2 year notice to blind, elderly, and disabled tenants); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-4.12(e) (Supp. 1983) (1 year notice to elderly tenants); S.C. CODE ANN..
§ 27-31-420(A) (Supp. 1983) (120 day notice to elderly tenants); VA. CODE § 55-79.94(f) (Supp.
1983) (local governments authorized to require 3 year notice to elderly and disabled tenants).
45. A I year notice requirement for elderly and disabled tenants is advocated in Note, MunicipalRegulationof Condominium Conversionsin California,53 S. CAL. L. REv. 225, 277 (1979). See
also Comment, supra note 22 at 331; Note, supra note 31 at 364.
46. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
47. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1326(B)(2) (Supp. 1983) (30 day first-purchase option);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66427.1(d) (West 1983) (90 day first-purchase option); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 47-88b(c) & (j) (West Supp. 1983) (90 day first-purchase option to individual tenant; 30
day first-purchase option to tenants' association); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1638 (1981) (60 day firstpurchase option); FLA. STAT. § 718.612 (Supp. 1981) (45 day first-purchase option followed by
right of first refusal to subsequent public offers at more favorable terms); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-387(b) (Supp. 1983) (60 day first-purchase option followed by right of first refusal to subsequent
public offers at more favorable terms); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 330(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983)
(30 day first-purchase option); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1604-111 (b) (Supp. 1983) (60 day
first-purchase option followed by 180 day ban on public sale at more favorable terms); MD. REAL
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Although North Carolina's thirty-day option period is shorter than that
provided by most jurisdictions, 48 it should provide a tenant sufficient time to
analyze the relevant information pertaining to the conversion and reach an
intelligent decision. This decision is greatly simplified because the tenant al-

ready is familiar with the layout and condition of the complex and his particular apartment. Many tenants will desire a longer option period so they can

explore housing and financing options, but this desire must be balanced
against the landlord's interest in proceeding with the conversion. As such, the
thirty-day option, although short, is adequate. The thirty-day period to complete the sale after exercise of the option is also adequate. A condominium
developer usually establishes standard sales terms for all conversion units and
obtains advance financing commitments from area lending institutions for
qualifying purchasers. 4 9 Thus, the tenant-purchaser probably will not face

lengthy negotiations or a prolonged search for financing. Any terms subject to
negotiation can be settled within the thirty-day period. If the tenant chooses
to secure his own financing, he has sixty days to accomplish that goal-the
thirty-day option period plus the thirty-day settlement period. Thus, although
the option is not a cure-all, 50 it provides needed guarantees for those tenants
who are willing and able to buy their units.

On their face, the option and settlement provisions should guarantee the
tenant's right to purchase his unit if he so chooses. This result, however, may

be defeated by two further provisions of the statute and by a significant omission. First, the tenant does not receive the first-option right to his unit if the
"boundaries of the converted unit do not substantially conform to the dimensions of the residential unit before conversion." 5 1 A landlord could claim that
improvements to the unit constitute a substantial change in dimensions and
PROP. CODE § I I-13 6(a) (Supp. 1983) (60 day first-purchase option); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515A.4l10(b) (West Supp. 1983) (60 day first-purchase option to buy followed by 180 day ban on public
sale at more favorable terms); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 356-B:56(II) (Supp. 1981) (60 day firstpurchase option); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.8 (West Supp. 1983) (first-purchase option); N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eee(2)(d)(ix) (McKinney Supp. 1983) (90 day first-purchase option); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(G) (Page 1981) (90 day first-purchase option); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 94.122 (1983) (60 day first-purchase option followed by 60 day right of first refusal to any public
offer at more favorable terms); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 3410 (Purdon Supp. 1983) (6 month firstpurchase option followed by 6 month right of first refusal to public offer at more favorable terms);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-4.12(b) (Supp. 1983) (60 day first-purchase option followed by 180 day
ban on public sale at more favorable terms); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-31-420(B) (Supp. 1983) (60 day
first-purchase option followed by 15 day right of first refusal to public offer at more favorable
terms); VA. CODE § 55-79.94(b) (Supp. 1983) (60 day first-purchase option); W.VA. CODE § 36B-4110(b) (Supp. 1983) (60 day first-purchase option followed by 180 day ban on sale to public at
more favorable terms); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 703.08(1) (West 1981) (60 day first-purchase option).
48. A 60 day option is required in 13 of the 21 jurisdictions requiring such options. Three
states have longer option periods. See supra note 47.
49. HUD REPORT, supra note 5, at 111-9. Such advance financing commitments are attractive
to financial institutions because the institution is guaranteed all loan business for the project and
gains a security interest in the entire project.
50. Only those tenants who are financially able to purchase their unit or who qualify for
financing will benefit from this provision. Tenants who are too poor to qualify for financing are
not assisted by this provision; they must rely on the ninety-day notice period to find replacement
housing or negotiate a lease agreement with the new unit owner.
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-36(b) (Supp. 1983).
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deny the tenant a first-purchase option. In such a case, the tenant would be
forced into litigation to preserve his option right. More significantly, this provision can create a dispute over option rights among the tenants if one unit is
divided and merged into adjoining units during conversion.5 2 For these reasons, the legislature should consider one commentator's suggestion that tenants be given the option to purchase a unit within the
conversion project if it is
53
no longer possible to purchase his particular unit.
Second, the tenant loses his right to specific performance of the option if
the landlord conveys the unit to a third-party purchaser who records the conveyance.5 4 Although this result follows North Carolina's long-standing status
as a "pure race" recording jurisdiction, 55 it robs the option of any real meaning. If the third-party purchaser records the conveyance, the tenant is limited
to a suit for damages. Damages provide an inadequate remedy because, with
the exception of moving expenses, the tenant can prove no pecuniary loss.
This result, however, could be avoided by a statutory provision for alternative
remedies. Such a provision might include a right to purchase an unsold unit
or to recover liquidated damages in the amount of a set percentage of the
unit's value. Either alternative would discourage landlords from selling units
in violation of the tenant's option right.
A major omission from the North Carolina statute poses the final hazard
to the option right. The tenant's option right may prove meaningless if the
landlord demands an excessive price from the tenant during the option period,
waits for the option to expire, and then offers the unit to the public at more
favorable terms. A landlord might choose this course of action if he wanted to
end relations with the tenant. To prevent such treatment of tenants, several
states provide a statutory right of first refusal for a set period after the option
expires. 56 Under this system, if the tenant declines to exercise his option and
the landlord subsequently offers the unit to a third party at more favorable
terms, the tenant has the right to purchase the unit at those terms. This firstrefusal right requires the landlord to negotiate in good.faith and eliminates the
temptation to wait out the option period. It has received support from commentators5 7 and should be included in the North Carolina statute.
Currently, all residential tenant conversion rights in North Carolina are
provided by state law; local governments apparently lack authority to supple52. Wynn, Condominium Conversions and Tenant Rights-isconsin Statutes Section 703.08
What Kind o/ProtectionDoes it Really Provide?, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 73, 80 (1979).
53. Id at 81.

54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-36(c) (Supp. 1983).
55. Under a "pure race" recording system, the grantee who first records his deed will prevail
over any other conveyance from the title source. This grantee will prevail regardless of any notice
he may have of a prior, unrecorded conveyance. See N.C. GEN.STAT. § 47-18(a) (1976), construed
in Hill v. Pinelawn Memorial Park, Inc., 304 N.C. 159, 282 S.E.2d 779 (1981); Patterson v. Bryant,
216 N.C. 550, 5 S.E.2d 849 (1939).
56. Ten states currently provide a right of first refusal: Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maine,
Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and West Virginia. See supra

note 47.
57. See, e.g., Note, supra note 31, at 364.
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ment these state protections either by direct regulation 58 or through the exercise of zoning powers.59 Thus, the North Carolina legislature should enact a
sound and comprehensive tenant conversion rights statute. Although the current statute is a significant step in that direction, it is incomplete. The statute
establishes a tenant's right to notice of conversion, a provision characterized as
"the most fundamental tenant protection of all." 60 This notice requirement,
however, fails to address the unique housing needs of elderly and disabled
tenants. These tenants are affected most severely by a conversion and require
more time to locate replacement housing. Accordingly, they should be provided additional notice of an impending conversion beyond the ninety days
provided to all tenants.
The statute also correctly grants the tenant an option to purchase his converted unit before it is offered for public sale. Such an option will limit the
disruptive effects of a conversion and avoid the expense of a move for those
tenants willing and able to buy their unit. The statute in its present form,
however, cannot fully implement this policy. A tenant can lose his option
right if the conversion involves changes to the building layout or if the developer demands an excessive option price in an effort to wait out the option
period. Moreover, this option right is unenforceable if the landlord conveys
the unit to a third party who records the conveyance. The legislature should
amend the statute to preclude any of these possibilities.
Condominium conversion is an established phenomenon in the American
housing market. It offers significant benefits to landlords, developers, purchasers, and local communities. 6 1 Conversion, however, can impose severe strain,
even hardship, on the original tenant of the conversion property. This adverse
58. Prior to 1983 city and municipal governments were permitted to supplement all provisions of the Unit Ownership Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-27 (1976) (amended Id. (Cum. Supp.
1983)). When the tenant protection provisions were added as article 2 of the Act in 1983, this
authorization to supplement the Act was limited to the provisions of article 1, which governs the
registration, public sale, and management of condominiums. 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 624,
§ 2 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. 47A-27 (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
59. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
The problems created by condominium conversion vary from community to community; cities with a heavy reliance on rental housing experience the most severe impact. The legislature
should permit local governments to respond to conversion problems by granting them some regulatory authority. Certainly, no North Carolina city is experiencing the conversion problems of the
large urban centers, but some flexibility of response is needed.
60. Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 132 (report of Legal Research and Servs. for the
Elderly).
61. The advantages to a community of condominium conversion are detailed in Comment,
supra note 22, at 314-17. Because the aggregate value of the individual converted units exceeds
the value of the building as rental property, conversion increases the local tax base. Moreover,
condominiums receive better maintenance than rental property and many buildings and individual units receive extensive renovation on conversion. Finally, conversion attracts upper and middle class families back into urban areas. Consumer spending by these families benefits area
businesses. See also HUD REPORT, supra note 5, at VIII-I to -36.
One commentator rejects this conclusion, arguing that, with the exception of the increased tax
base, conversion offers no economic advantages to the community. Senate Hearings,supra note 6,
at 49 (statement of Daniel Lauber, Planning/Communications Assocs.). Lauber argues that conversions typically occur in already stable neighborhoods and that the conversion itself is destabilizing because it displaces a large number of tenants.
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impact can be reduced through appropriate legislation. North Carolina has
initiated such a legislative response, one that it should now complete.
DAVID JAMES BURGE

